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a b s t r a c t
We derive several bounds for the price of anarchy of the noncooperative congestion games
with elastic demands and asymmetric linear or nonlinear cost functions. The bounds
established depend on a constant from the cost functions as well as the ratio between user
benefit and social surplus at Nash equilibrium. The results can be viewed a generalization of
that of Chau and Sim [C.K. Chau, K.M. Sim, The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion
games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands, Operations Research Letters 31
(2003) 327–334] for the symmetric case, or a generalization of Perakis [G. Perakis, The
price of anarchy when costs are nonseparable and asymmetric, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 3064 (2004) 46–58] to the elastic demand.
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In noncooperative games, agents perform selfishly, i.e., each agent selects her strategy trying to minimize her own cost.
When no agent can improve her cost by unilaterally changing her strategy, the system arrives at the Nash equilibrium,
or Wardropian User Equilibrium (UE) in the transportation literature. On the other hand, the system manager hopes that
the overall cost in the system is minimized, which corresponds to Wardropian System Optimum (SO) in the transportation
literature. Generally, Nash equilibria do not minimize the overall cost in the system. In real urban traffic systems, observed
flows are likely to be closer to UE than SO, i.e., there is an efficiency loss in the system.
To characterize the efficiency loss in the system with fixed demand, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3] introduced the
notion ‘‘the price of anarchy’’, also known as ‘‘coordination ratio’’, which is the ratio between the system cost at the worst
Nash equilibrium and the optimum system cost. Their result was then improved by Czumaj and Vöcking [4]. Subsequently,
Roughgarden and Tardos [5], Roughgarden [6], and Correa et al. [7,8] applied this idea to the classical network equilibrium
problem in transportation with link cost functions that are separable of arc flows. Chau and Sim [1] extended Roughgarden
andTardos’s results to nonseparable but symmetric cost functions. Then Perakis [2] considered the case that the cost function
was asymmetric and proved some tight bounds. Han and Sun [9] then proposed some new bounds for the asymmetric and
nonlinear, nonseparable cost functions, which depend on an intrinsic constant of the cost function.
All the results mentioned above considered the fixed demand case, except [1], which also considered the elastic demand
case. In [1], Chau and Sim proposed a ‘‘weaker’’ bound with symmetric cost function and elastic demand. The bound is
‘‘weaker’’ in the sense that, unlike its counterpart with fixed demand, the bound depends on not only a constant from the
cost function itself, but also on the ratio between ‘‘user benefit’’ and ‘‘social surplus’’ at Nash equilibrium (for the definition
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of these two terms, see Definition 2.1 in the next section). This result is from the fact that in the elastic demand case, one
cannot simply seek to minimize the total system cost as the system objective (because the minimized system cost is zero).
Thus, the price of anarchy in this case is defined as the ratio between the maximum social surplus and the total surplus at
user equilibrium.
In this paper, we consider the price of anarchy for the elastic demand case but with asymmetric cost functions. The
bounds derived here also depend on the ratio between user benefit and social surplus at the user equilibrium.
In the next section, we list some useful notations and describe our model under consideration. We derive and prove our
bounds on the price of anarchy in Section 3 and give two simple examples to illustrate our results in Section 4. Section 5
consists of some concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
Let I = {1, 2, . . . , I} denote a set of populations where population i ∈ I has a mass ni, where each infinitesimal
agent within the population is represented by a point in [0, ni]. The aggregated population masses are a vector n ∈ RI+.
F = {1, 2, . . . , F} denotes a set of shared resources where agents collectively generate a utilization rate vf for each f ∈ F .
The aggregate utilization rates are a vector v ∈ RF+. S = {1, 2, . . . , S} denotes a set of strategies available to each i ∈ I. A
is an I × S population-strategy incidence matrix where entry ai,s is 1 if strategy s is available to i, 0 otherwise. Z is an F × S
consumption rate matrix with zf ,s ≥ 0 being the consumption rate when f is invoked by strategy s. Let xs be the strategy
distribution of total population mass choosing strategy s ∈ S and the aggregated strategy distributions are a vector x ∈ RS+.
Variables x, v, n, satisfy the following constraints:
v = Zx,
n = Ax,
x ≥ 0.
For each n, the feasible set of the aggregated strategy distributions is defined as X(n) = {x ∈ RS+ | n = Ax, x ≥ 0},
which is a convex set.
The resource cost function is defined as c(v) : RF+ → RF+ with each cf (v) representing the cost function of f with
respect to the aggregated utilization rates. c(v) is said to be symmetric if ∂cf (v)/∂vg = ∂cg(v)/∂vf , ∀g, f ∈ F , and if
c(v) = (cf (vf ))>f∈F , i.e., cf only depends on the utilization rate on f for all f ∈ F , c(v) is said to be separable. The cost
function c(v) is said to be linear if c(v) = Mv + φ, where M is an F × F matrix and φ is a vector with mf ,g ≥ 0, φg ≥ 0,
∀f , g ∈ F . Then, a tuple (I, F , A, Z, c, n) defines a noncooperative congestion game.
If n is a fixed vector, then the game is a fixed-demand congestion game; otherwise, it is a elastic-demand game and n
is a demand map. That is, n(d) : RI+ → RI+ is the demand function, where d ∈ RI+ is a vector of minimum private costs
experienced by each population. We will assume that n(d) is separable and strictly decreasing. With this assumption, the
inverse demand map d(n) is well defined.
Let t(x) : RS+ → RS+ be the private cost with respect to strategy distribution x, with each component ts(x) denoting the
private cost experienced by an agent who employs strategy s. Here we adopt the additive cost
ts(x) =
∑
f∈F
zf ,scf (v),
that is, the cost of a strategydistribution of total populationmass choosing the strategy xs is the sumof the cost on f consisting
in s. More concisely,
t(x) = Z>c(v).
The system is said to arrive at Nash equilibrium, if there is no agent motivating to unilaterally change her strategy. That
is, there is a strategy distribution x¯ such that
ts(x¯)
{= di, if x¯s > 0,
≥ di, if x¯s = 0, ∀s ∈ Si, i ∈ I, (1)
where di is the minimum private cost and the aggregated minimum private costs are a vector d ∈ RI+.
According to [10], the Nash equilibrium (1) can be mathematically formulated as a variational inequality
t(x¯)>(x− x¯)− d(n¯)>(n− n¯) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X(n), n ≥ 0. (2)
In the following, we will always assume that the Nash equilibrium exists.
Definition 2.1. Assuming di(0) <∞, ∀i ∈ I, the user benefit is defined as
U(x,n) =
∑
i∈I
∫ ni
0
di(ω)dω
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and the social surplus is defined as
E(x,n) =
∑
i∈I
∫ ni
0
di(ω)dω − x>t(x). 
Hence, the system optimum (xˆ, nˆ) is defined as
(xˆ, nˆ) = argmax
x∈X(n),n≥0
E(x,n) (3)
and the total surplus at Nash equilibrium is E(x¯, n¯). Consequently, the price of anarchy for noncooperative congestion game
is defined as the ratio E(xˆ, nˆ)/E(x¯, n¯).
If the demand function n is a constant, then the game reduces to a noncooperative congestion game with fixed demand
and the Nash equilibrium is characterized as
t(x¯)>(x− x¯) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X,
where X = {x ∈ RS+ | Ax = n, x ≥ 0}. The system optimum xˆ is defined as
xˆ = argmin
x∈X
x>t(x)
and the total system cost at Nash equilibrium is x¯>t(x¯). The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio between the overall
system cost at Nash equilibrium and the optimum system cost, i.e., x¯>t(x¯)/xˆ>t(xˆ). Many bounds for the noncooperative
congestion games have been established, see [1–3,5,6,9], for example.
3. Bounds for the price of anarchy
In this section, we derive several bounds for the price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with elastic demand
and asymmetric cost functions.
We need the following result to derive our bounds.
Lemma 3.1 ([1, Lemma 4.2]). If every di(ni) is a nonincreasing function for ni ≥ 0, then∑
i∈I
∫ nˆi
0
di(z)dz ≤
∑
i∈I
∫ n¯i
0
di(z)dz + d(n¯)>(nˆ− n¯). (4)
Proof. Since d is a nonincreasing function,
∫ n¯i
0 di(z)dz is a concave function and (4) follows directly. 
To derive the bounds, we have to introduce two quantities for measuring the degree of asymmetry and the nonlinearity.
The following definition is from Definition 2 of [2].
Definition 3.1. The quantity c2 for the nonlinear function t, whichmeasures the asymmetry of the Jacobian∇t(x), is defined
as
c2 ≡ sup
x∈X
‖S(x)−1∇t(x)‖2S(x), (5)
where
S(x) = ∇t(x)+∇t(x)
>
2
is the symmetrized part of the Jacobian matrix ∇t(x). 
The following definition was first used in [11,12] in the analysis of interior point methods. It finds new applications
recently in the analysis of the price of anarchy [2].
Definition 3.2. The function t : Rn → Rn is said to satisfy the Jacobian similarity condition if there exists κ ≥ 1 such that
∀w ∈ Rn, ∀x, x¯ ∈ X , there holds
κ−1w>∇t(x)w ≤ w>∇t(x¯)w ≤ κw>∇t(x)w. 
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that t(x) satisfies the Jacobian similarity condition and that t(0)>x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X(n),n ≥ 0. Then
E(xˆ, nˆ)/E(x¯, n¯) ≤
(
1− c
2κ
4
)
+ c
2κ
4
· U(x¯, n¯)
E(x¯, n¯)
.
2740 D. Han et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 56 (2008) 2737–2743
Proof. Since (x¯, n¯) is a solution of the variational inequality problem (2) and (xˆ, nˆ) is the system optimum solution, we have
(xˆ− x¯)>t(x¯)− d(n¯)>(nˆ− n¯) ≥ 0.
Combining this inequality and (4) and rearranging terms, we have
∑
i∈I
∫ n¯i
0
di(ω)dω − x¯>t(x¯)−
(∑
i∈I
∫ nˆi
0
di(ω)dω − xˆ>t(xˆ)
)
+ (t(x¯)− t(xˆ))> xˆ ≥ 0. (6)
From the mean value theorem, there is some α ∈ [0, 1], such that
t(x¯)− t(xˆ) = ∇t(x1)(x¯− xˆ),
where
x1 = xˆ+ α(x¯− xˆ).
Thus,
(t(x¯)− t(xˆ))>xˆ = xˆ>∇t(x1)(x¯− xˆ)
= −xˆ>∇t(x1)xˆ+ x¯>∇t(x1)>S(x1)−1S(x1)xˆ
≤ −xˆ>∇t(x1)xˆ+ ‖x¯>∇t(x1)>S(x1)−1‖S(x1)‖x¯‖S(x1)
≤ −xˆ>∇t(x1)xˆ+ ‖x¯‖S(x1)‖S(x1)−1∇t(x1)‖S(x1)‖xˆ‖S(x1)
≤ −xˆ>∇t(x1)xˆ+ c‖x¯‖S(x1)‖xˆ‖S(x1), (7)
where the first inequality follows from the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, the second one from the norm inequality, and the
last one from (5). For any two vectors x and y in Rn, we have
2
√
b1b2‖x‖S‖y‖S ≤ b1‖x‖2S + b2‖y‖2S
if b1, b2 ≥ 0. This implies that
c‖x‖S‖y‖S ≤ b1‖x‖2S + b2‖y‖2S (8)
if b1, b2 ≥ 0 and b1b2 ≥ c2/4. It follows from (7) and (8) that
(t(x¯)− t(xˆ))>xˆ ≤ −xˆ>∇t(x1)xˆ+ c
2
4
· x¯>∇t(x1)x¯+ xˆ>∇t(x1)xˆ
= c
2
4
· x¯>∇t(x1)x¯. (9)
Applying again the mean value theorem, we assert that there is β ∈ [0, 1], such that
(t(x¯)− t(0))>(x¯− 0) = x¯>∇t(x2)x¯, where x2 = x¯− βx¯. (10)
Since t(0) ≥ 0, x¯ ≥ 0, it follows that
x¯>∇t(x2)x¯ ≤ t(x¯)>x¯. (11)
Then, (7) and (11) and Jacobian similarity mean that
(t(x¯)− t(xˆ))>xˆ ≤ c
2
4
· x¯>∇t(x1)x¯ ≤ c
2
4
κ · x¯>∇t(x2)x¯ ≤ c
2
4
κ x¯>t(x¯). (12)
Substituting (12) into (6), we have∑
i∈I
∫ n¯i
0
di(ω)dω −
(
1− c
2κ
4
)
x¯>t(x¯)−
(∑
i∈I
∫ nˆi
0
di(ω)dω − xˆ>t(xˆ)
)
≥ 0,
i.e.,
E(xˆ, nˆ) ≤
(
1− c
2κ
4
)
E(x¯, n¯)+ c
2κ
4
U(x¯, n¯),
and the assertion of the theorem follows immediately. 
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If the cost function t is linear, i.e., t(x) = Mx+ q, whereM is an F × F , positive definite and possibly asymmetric matrix,
and q>x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X(n), then the constant κ = 1. The degree of asymmetry of a matrixM is
c2 ≡ ‖S−1M‖2S ≡ sup
w 6=0
‖S−1Mw‖2S
‖w‖2S
= sup
w 6=0
w>M>S−1Mw
w>Sw
,
where S = M+M>2 is the symmetrized part of the matrixM and ‖w‖S ≡
√
w>Sw denotes the S-norm of a vectorw.
It is obvious that whenM is positive definite and symmetric, then, c2 = 1. The constant c2 was originally introduced by
Hammond [13] and has the following property:
Lemma 3.2. If M2 is a positive semidefinite matrix, then c2 ≤ 2. 
From Theorem 3.1, we have the following corollary immediately, which provides a bound of the price of anarchy for the
noncooperative congestion games with elastic and asymmetric linear cost functions.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that t(x) = Mx + q, M is positive definite and q>x ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X. Let x¯ be a solution of the user
optimization problem (2) and let xˆ be a solution of the system optimization problem (3). Then
E(xˆ, nˆ)/E(x¯, n¯) ≤
(
1− c
2
4
)
+ c
2
4
· U(x¯, n¯)
E(x¯, n¯)
. 
Remark. For the symmetric case whereM is symmetric positive definite, Chau and Sim [1] derived the bound 3/4+ 1/4 ·
U(v¯,n¯)
E(v¯,n¯) . Note that for this case, c
2 = 1 and our result reduces to Chau and Sim’s bound. 
4. Some examples
We now present some examples to illustrate our results.
Example 1. The following simple example is used to show that finding the bound of the price of anarchy for the network
equilibrium with elastic demand is not as manageable as in the fixed demand case, even if all the cost functions and the
demand functions are linear. This example was also used in [1] for the same purpose, but with errors and were corrected
in [14].
Consider a network with one OD pair and one link such that x = n and let the link travel time function be c(v) = av+ b
and the demand function d(n) = mn + h, where a ≥ 0 and m < 0, which ensures the existence of the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash equilibrium is v¯ = n¯ = h−ba−m , the social surplus is
E(v¯, n¯) = (h− b)
2
a−m ·
(
0.5m− a
a−m + 1
)
= m(h− b)
2
2(a−m)2
and the user benefit is
U(v¯, n¯) = 0.5m
(
h− b
a−m
)2
+ h(h− b)
a−m .
The system optimal solution is vˆ = nˆ = h−b2a−m and the corresponding social surplus is
E(vˆ, nˆ) = (h− b)
2
2(2a−m) .
Thus, the price of anarchy is
ρ = E(vˆ, nˆ)
E(v¯, n¯)
= (m− a)
2
m(m− 2a) . (13)
In this case, c = 1 and our bound is
% = 3
4
+ 1
4
· U(vˆ, nˆ)
E(vˆ, nˆ)
.
It can be seen from (13) that unlike the bound for the fixed demand case, both the price of anarchy and our bound for the
elastic demand case depend on the parameterm in the demand function. Ifm → 0 (the demand is perfectly elastic), both ρ
and % tend to infinity. To see this more clearly, we plot ρ and % as a function of−m for a = 2, b = 0.3, h = 5 (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. The price of anarchy and our bound as functions of−m.
Fig. 2. The Network in Example 2.
Fig. 3. The maximum of the eigenvalue as a function of x2 .
Example 2. Consider the following network with two nodes and two links (Fig. 2). Suppose that the demand function is
d(n) = −n+ 10, the cost function for link 1 is v1 + 1/4 and the cost function for link 2 is v22 + v2 + v1, i.e.,
c(v) = t(x) =
(
x1 + 1/4
x22 + x2 + x1
)
.
Then,
∇t(x) =
(
1 0
1 2x2 + 1
)
and κ = 3.56.
From Definition 3.1 we can see that
c2 = sup
x∈K
λmax(S(x)−1/2∇t(x)>S(x)−1∇t(x)S(x)−1/2).
We thus plot the maximum eigenvalue of matrix (S(x)−1/2∇t(x)>S(x)−1∇t(x)S(x)−1/2) for all x ∈ [0, 100]. Fig. 3 indicates
that the maximum eigenvalue decreases with respect to x2 and reaches its maximum at x2 = 0 and c2 = 4/3.
The Nash equilibrium is
v¯1 = n¯ = 4.875 and v¯2 = 0.
The social surplus at Nash equilibrium is
E(v¯, n¯) ≈ 11.8828
and the user benefit is
U(v¯, n¯) ≈ 36.8672.
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The system optimum is
vˆ1 ≈ 1.2748, vˆ1 ≈ 2.4001 and nˆ ≈ 3.6749.
The optimal social surplus is
E(vˆ, nˆ) ≈ 16.8796.
Thus, the price of anarchy is
ρ = E(vˆ, nˆ)
E(v¯, n¯)
≈ 16.8796
11.8828
= 1.4205
and our bound is
% =
(
1− c
2κ
4
)
+ c
2κ
4
· U(x¯, n¯)
E(x¯, n¯)
≈ 3.4950.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed some bounds for the price of anarchy of the noncooperative congestion games with elastic
demands and asymmetric linear or nonlinear cost functions. The bounds established depend on a constant from the cost
functions as well as the ratio between user benefit and social surplus at Nash equilibrium, similar to the bound in [1] for
the symmetric case. In this sense, our results can be viewed as generalization of that in [1] from the symmetric case to the
asymmetric case.
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